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3.1 Introduction
This paper adds an observation to the stock of empirical regularities in
the literature on speculative attacks. Comparing the behavior of successful
attacks on pegged exchange rates with successful defenses (instances when
a speculative attack occurred but did not precipitate a signiﬁcant change in
the prevailing rate), we show that there are costs of failing to successfully de-
fend against the attack. These are equivalent to approximately a year of eco-
nomic growth, or 3 percentage points of gross national product (GNP).
However, the output losses that follow successful attacks are only evident
for short periods; the diﬀerence between successful attacks and successful
defenses is signiﬁcant for just one year.
This ﬁnding helps to account for a number of observations about the be-
havior of open economies and their policy makers.
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~arose].• Readiness to mount a defense. We regularly observe governments and
central banks undertaking diﬃcult policy adjustments (sharp hikes in
interest rates, large ﬁscal cuts) in order to defend their currencies, de-
spite objections that these policies may precipitate a recession. Our
ﬁnding explains this behavior: the output costs of the alternative—fail-
ure to defend the currency—can be even higher.
• International Monetary Fund (IMF) exchange rate advice and condi-
tionality. Although the IMF has repeatedly urged its members to aban-
don soft pegs in favor of greater exchange rate ﬂexibility, it has also ex-
tended generous ﬁnancial assistance to countries seeking to defend
their currencies against attack.1Again, our ﬁnding helps to explain this
behavior: exiting a peg in a crisis tends to result in costly output losses,
something that the IMF as well as the national authorities wish to
avoid.
• The V-shaped recovery from the Asian crisis. A number of observers
have commented on the “V-shaped” recovery of the Asian countries
from their 1997–98 crisis (sharp falls in output were followed by equally
sharp recoveries after an interval of one to two years). We show that,
rather than reﬂecting unique characteristics of Asia’s crisis or its
economies, as is sometimes suggested, this pattern is quite general.2 It
is the typical response of output to a successful attack.
The question is whether this post-crisis behavior of output is a conse-
quenceof the success of the attack or simply a reﬂection of the causesof that
outcome. Is it the resolve to mount a successful defense that determines the
subsequent behavior of output, or is it the behavior of output (and associ-
ated variables) that determines the success or failure of the attack? To put
the same point another way, is it the decision of how to respond to the spec-
ulative attack that shapes the subsequent performance of the economy, or
do countries that are unable to defend their currencies have other problems
that both render them unable to beat back the speculators and contribute
to the severity of their post-crisis recessions?
The beneﬁt of the doubt should be given to the view that it is diﬀerences
in the pre-crisis characteristics of economies that explain both diﬀerences
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1. In the words of the managing director, “Experience has shown that heavily managed or
pegged exchange rate regimes can be tested suddenly by exchange markets, and that it can be
very costly either to defend them or to exit under disorderly circumstances. On balance, we
have a responsibility to advise our members that while such regimes can succeed, the require-
ments for a country to maintain a pegged or heavily managed exchange rate are daunting—es-
pecially when the country is strongly engaged with international capital markets” (Koehler
2001, 3–4).
2. Thus, authors like Sachs and Stiglitz have pointed to the quick rebound of output in coun-
tries like Korea as evidence that their crises reﬂected problems of investor panic rather than
ﬂawed fundamentals like those that underly currency crises in many other emerging markets.
Insofar as our results suggest that there was nothing special about the nature of the postcrisis
behavior of output, such inferences become more diﬃcult to draw.in their abilities to rebuﬀ a speculative attack and diﬀerences in the post-
attack behavior of output. Imagine, for example, that growth is weakening
and unemployment is rising. The authorities will then be less ready to em-
ploy higher interest rates to defend the currency. Knowing this, speculators
will have more incentive to attack and a greater likelihood of success
(Jeanne 1997). To the extent that output movements are persistent, post-
crisis macroeconomic performance will be disappointing. However, it is not
the success or failure of the attack that determines the behavior of output;
rather, it is the behavior of output that determines the success or failure of
the attack. To put the point another way, it is a third variable (the pre-crisis
state of the economy) that determines the response of both policy makers
and the economy to the crisis.3
Given this presumption, it is striking that we are unable to detect diﬀer-
ences in the pre-crisis state of the economy that can explain the very diﬀer-
ent post-crisis performance in cases where speculative attacks succeed and
cases where they fail.
• The behavior of output appears to be no diﬀerent prior to successful
attacks and prior to successful defenses.
• The behavior of other economic and ﬁnancial variables appears to be
no diﬀerent prior to successful attacks and prior to successful defenses.
• The behavior of a variety of political variables appears to be no diﬀer-
ent prior to successful attacks and prior to successful defenses.
• Econometric techniques designed to account for unobservable diﬀer-
ences in countries mounting successful and unsuccessful defenses do
not weaken the ﬁnding of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the subsequent be-
havior of output.
• The addition of country credit ratings as a way of capturing otherwise
unquantiﬁable economic and ﬁnancial vulnerabilities changes none of
our ﬁndings.
• Our key results survive a battery of additional sensitivity analyses.
Although the facts are clear, their implications are less so. Our preferred
interpretation is as follows. Failure to successfully defend a currency
against attack is a shock to conﬁdence. Involuntary abandonment of the ex-
change rate regime that previously served as the nominal anchor for policy
raises doubts in the minds of the markets about the prospects for stability.
We thus observe a loss of policy discipline following a successful attack: the
growth of the money base accelerates, and inﬂation rises (relative to cases
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3. One can imagine a variety of other plausible arguments working in the same direction.
For example, a heavy load of short-term foreign currency–denominated debt could both make
governments less willing to raise interest rates to defend the currency (since higher interest
rates will raise debt-servicing costs) and make the post-crisis economic performance weaker
(since devaluation will make life more diﬃcult for ﬁrms whose debts are denominated in for-
eign currency but whose revenues are domestic currency denominated).in which the speculative attack is successfully rebuﬀed). Risk premia rise,
depressing consumption and investment. Only countries that succeed in
establishing a clear and credible alternative monetary anchor succeed in
avoiding these costs. Examples that spring to mind include the United
Kingdom and Sweden, which embraced inﬂation targeting, ﬁrst implicitly
and then formally, following their 1992 crises; Italy’s continued commit-
ment to European monetary uniﬁcation following its ejection from the ex-
change rate mechanism (ERM); and Brazil’s resort to inﬂation targeting
following involuntary abandonment of its exchange rate peg in early 1998.
We establish these points in our paper, which is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 3.2 describes the data and their characteristics. Section 3.3 then sub-
jects them to multivariate analysis. Section 3.4 reports the results of a series
of sensitivity analyses. Section 3.5, in concluding, returns to the broader im-
plications of our ﬁndings.
To avoid confusion, we should reiterate what we do and do not set out
to establish in this paper. Our concern is to compare post-crisis economic
performance in cases in which the speculative attack succeeds and those in
which it fails. It is to show that there is little evidence of diﬀerences in the
pre-crisis structure and performance of the economies falling into these
two categories that can help to account for the apparent diﬀerent post-
crisis outcomes. Our concern is not whether there are diﬀerences between
countries that do and do not experience speculative attacks. The latter is a
separate question. It is the subject of a diﬀerent literature (much of which
purports to identify leading indicators of currency crises). It is not our
topic here.
3.2 Data
The macroeconomic and ﬁnancial data used in this paper were extracted
from the 2000 World Development Indicators CD-ROM produced by the
World Bank.4 They are annual and cover the period 1960–98. We consider
essentially all middle- and high-income countries with average populations
64 Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose
4. The macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables we utilize include real GDP, private con-
sumption, the consolidated government budget deﬁcit (as a percent of GDP), the oﬃcial bi-
lateral dollar exchange rate, gross international reserves, the ratio of reserves to imports, the
current account balance (as a percent of GDP), exports and imports of goods and services, to-
tal debt service (as a percent of GNP), deposit and lending rates (in percent), the interest rate
spread (deﬁned as the lending rate minus LIBOR), the consumer price index inﬂation rate, M1
and M2, credit to the private sector (as a percent of GDP), banking sector credit to the private
sector (as a percent of GDP), and the market capitalization of listed companies (as a percent
of GDP). The data set was checked and corrected for outliers and transcription errors. In ad-
dition, we use series on capital controls from the IMF’s annual report on Exchange Arrange-
ments and Exchange Restrictions, country credit ratings from Institutional Investor, and politi-
cal variables kindly provided by David Leblang.of at least one million (eighty-nine in number, of which ﬁfty-seven experi-
ence at least one crisis during the sample period).5
Our country sample is chosen to align closely with that used in Kraay
(1998), enabling us to use that author’s crisis dates.6 Kraay deﬁnes a suc-
cessful attack as the ﬁrst observation following a year of stable exchange
rates when the rate of currency depreciation exceeds 10 percent.7 Failed at-
tacks are deﬁned as episodes when nongold reserves decline by at least 20
percent after a year in which neither a successful nor a failed attack oc-
curred.8
We begin with simple comparisons of economic and ﬁnancial variables
before and after successful attacks and successful defenses. In both cases,
the average behavior of the variable in question is compared to the average
behavior of the same variable for noncrisis periods—that is, tranquil peri-
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5. The exact list of countries is (in order of World Bank country code): Albania; United Arab
Emirates; Argentina; Australia; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Bolivia; Brazil; Brunei;
Botswana; Canada; Switzerland; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Ger-
many; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; Spain; Finland; France; Gabon;
United Kingdom; Greece; Guatemala; Hong Kong; Hungary; Indonesia; Ireland; Iran Is-
lamic Rep.; Iraq; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Jordan; Japan; Korea; Kuwait; Lebanon; Libya; Mo-
rocco; Mexico; Macedonia FYR; Mauritius; Malaysia; Namibia; the Netherlands; Norway;
New Zealand; Oman; Peru; the Philippines; Papua New Guinea; Poland; Korea Dem. Rep.;
Portugal; Paraguay; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Sweden; Syrian Arab Republic; Thailand;
Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uruguay; United States; Venezuela; Yugoslavia FR
(Serbia/Montenegro); and South Africa. Kraay does not actually list his countries, but we have
followed his description as closely as possible.
6. Among other things, this frees us of the objection that we have selected successful and un-
successful attacks as a function of the subsequent behavior of output (especially since the pur-
pose of Kraay’s paper—to analyze the eﬃcacy of the interest rate defense—is independent of
our research).
7. Kraay writes: “I ﬁrst identify all episodes in which the one-month depreciation rate (i.e.,
the increase in the nominal exchange rate) exceeds 10%, which is roughly two standard devia-
tions above the mean depreciation rate for the entire sample. In order for these large depreci-
ations to be meaningfully considered successful speculative attacks, it is necessary that the ex-
change rate be relatively ﬁxed prior to the depreciation itself. Accordingly, for each observation
I construct the average over the previous twelve months of the absolute value of percentage
changes in the nominal exchange rate. I then eliminate all large depreciation episodes for which
this average exceeded 2.5%, or about one half of one standard deviation from the mean for the
entire sample. I deﬁne these events as successful speculative attacks. Finally, in order to avoid
‘double-counting’ prolonged crises in which the nominal exchange rate depreciates sharply for
several months, I further eliminate successful attacks that were preceded by successful attacks
in any of the prior twelve months.”
8. Again, to quote Kraay: “To identify unsuccessful speculative attacks, I ﬁrst consider all
episodes in which the monthly decline in non-gold reserves exceeds 20%, which is about two
standard deviations above the mean decline in reserves for the entire sample. In order to re-
strict attention to large reserve losses incurred defending relatively ﬁxed exchange rates, I elim-
inate all those episodes for which the same moving average of absolute values of changes in the
nominal exchange rate as before was greater than 2.5%. Next, to eliminate large reserve losses
accompanying successful attacks, I exclude all episodes in which the change in the nominal ex-
change rate in the same month or any of the three following months was greater than 10%. I
deﬁne these episodes as failed speculative attacks and, as before, I eliminate all failed attacks
that are preceded by a failed attack in any of the twelve previous months.”ods in which neither successful attacks nor successful defenses occur—and
surrounded by a 2–standard deviation band.
Figures 3.1and 3.2 portray the variables of interest from three years prior
to three years after the event. Figure 3.1 considers domestic variables, ﬁg-
ure 3.2 external variables, for our 92 successful attacks and 184 failed at-
tacks. Adding a three-year exclusion window to ensure that we do not
double-count crisis observations (note that this is the same exclusion win-
dow that we use in the formal statistical analysis that follows) does not
change the results.
Consider ﬁrst the two top-left-hand panels of ﬁgure 3.1, which display
GNP growth around the time of successful attacks and successful defenses.
They show that growth rate averages about 3 percent in the three years pre-
ceding both successful attacks and successful defenses. This is quite close to
the average in noncrisis periods (as denoted by the horizontal line). Growth
then falls sharply, to barely zero, in the year of a successful attack and the
year following, before recovering to pre-attack levels. In contrast, there is
little change in growth rates either before or after successful defenses.
We can reject at the 99 percent confidence level that the post-crisis be-
havior of output is the same in countries that succumb to attacks and those
that mount successful defenses. Here, then, the ﬁrst key result of this paper
makes its appearance.
The other panels hint at what may be driving these diﬀerences in post-
crisis performance. Narrow money (M1) growth and inflation rise in the
wake of successful attacks but not in the wake of successful defenses, sug-
gesting a loss of monetary discipline when defense of the currency is aban-
doned.9Consumption and investment growth both fall, despite the decline in
real interest rates that accompanies the acceleration in inﬂation, further sug-
gesting a loss in conﬁdence.10Interest rate spreads (deﬁned as the lending rate
minus London Interbank Oﬀered Rate [LIBOR]) rise following successful
attacks, again suggesting declining conﬁdence and rising risk perceptions.
However, there are no comparable diﬀerences in the behavior of any of
these variables in the three years preceding the event. Growth is no diﬀer-
ent in the run-up to successful attacks and successful defenses. Inﬂation and
money growth are no diﬀerent. Budget deﬁcits are no diﬀerent. It is not ob-
vious, in other words, that diﬀerences in the precrisis development of these
macroeconomic variables explain the diﬀerent outcome of the speculative
attack.11
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9. The diﬀerence in M1 growth between successful and unsuccessful defenders just misses
statistical signiﬁcance at the 95 percent conﬁdence level. The diﬀerence in inﬂation does not
approach signiﬁcance at conventional conﬁdence levels.
10. The diﬀerence in post-crisis real interest rates between successful and unsuccessful de-
fenders is statistically signiﬁcant at the 95 percent conﬁdence level, but the diﬀerence in post-
crisis consumption growth is not. (The same is true of investment.)
11. Formal statistical tests show that none of these variables behaves signiﬁcantly diﬀerently























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Figure 3.2 provides analogous evidence for external variables. Countries
that experience a crisis display somewhat more real exchange rate appre-
ciation, larger current account deficits, and higher ratios of debt service
to GNP (compared to countries that do not) prior to the event. This consis-
tent with mainstream models of the determinants of speculative attacks.12
However, to repeat, our concern in this paper is not whether there are diﬀer-
ences between countries that do and do not experience crises, but whether
there are diﬀerences in the pre-crisis behavior of these variables between
countries that mount successful and unsuccessful defenses. While there is
some sign that countries that are unable to defend against speculative at-
tacks tend to have more short-term debt in their total debt loan and to have
experienced more real eﬀective exchange rate appreciation in the run-up to
the crisis (compared to the successful defenders), in no case is the behavior
of these variables signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from in tranquil periods (as indi-
cated by the 2–standard deviation bands), and in no case is the behavior of
these variables signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between successful attacks and suc-
cessful defenses in the year preceding the crisis.13 There are no diﬀerences
between successful attacks and successful defenses in the size of the current
account deﬁcit in the year immediately preceding the crisis, and there are no
discernible diﬀerences in the consequent debt service burdens.14 We cannot
reject (at anything approaching conventional conﬁdence levels) the null that
these external variables behave the same in the successful attack and suc-
cessful defense cases in the year immediately preceding the crisis.
Following the crisis, the real eﬀective exchange rate depreciates in coun-
tries that abandon defense of their currencies, relative to both the no-crisis
cases and the successful defenders. Export growth accelerates and current
accounts strengthen, consistent with the aforementioned collapse of con-
sumption. These patterns are consistent with the very diﬀerent post-crisis
behavior of GNP growth in countries that mount successful and unsuc-
cessful defenses against speculative attacks.15
Tables 3.1through 3.3take a diﬀerent look at this same question. We now
ask not whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the behavior of these
variables before successful attacks and successful defenses (which was the
question that occupied us before), but whether there is evidence that a given
value of these variables has a diﬀerent impact on the likelihood of success-
ful attacks and successful defenses. Table 3.1is most directly comparable to
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12. For completeness, we note that the diﬀerences between the crisis and noncrisis countries
are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional conﬁdence levels for the current account but not for
the other two variables.
13. Formally, we are unable to reject the null that their values are the same in successful at-
tacks and successful defenses at the 95 percent conﬁdence level.
14. The statement in the preceding footnote again applies.
15. However, the evolution of none of these three variables diﬀers signiﬁcantly (that is, at the
95 percent conﬁdence level) in the post-crisis period between successful and unsuccessful de-
fenders.Table 3.1 Univariate Multinomial Logit Results
Year Before Year After
Successful Successful Successful Successful
Attacks Defenses Attacks Defenses
GDP growth –0.02 –0.00 –0.06 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Consumption growth 0.00 –0.01 –0.06 –0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Budget (% GDP) –0.05 –0.03 –0.08 –0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
M1 growth 0.001 –0.00 0.004 –0.01
(0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010)
M2 growth –0.001 –0.002 0.000 –0.01
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010)
Interest rate spread –0.000 –0.002 0.000 –0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Real interest rate 0.01 –0.00 –0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Current account (% GDP) –0.04 –0.04 –0.02 –0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Export growth –0.01 –0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Import growth –0.00 0.00 –0.02 –0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
M2/GDP –0.01 0.002 –0.01 0.002
(0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005)
M3/GDP –0.01 0.005 –0.01 0.001
(0.010) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005)
CPI inﬂation –0.001 –0.001 –0.0001 –0.01
(0.0010) (0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0100)
GDP inﬂation –0.001 –0.002 –0.002 –0.01
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0100)
M2/reserves –0.01 –0.02 –0.03 –0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Net international reserves –0.008 –0.000 0.005 0.005
(% change) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Real effective exchange rate 0.005 –0.003 –0.004 –0.004
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
$ Exchange rate (% change) –0.000 –0.002 0.008 –0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Short-term/total debt 0.01 –0.01 0.00 –0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Debt service (% GDP) 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Notes: Multinomial logit regression coefﬁcients (z-statistics). Default cell is tranquility. Each
row tabulates coefﬁcients from two separate logits (before and after crises). Three-year exclu-
sion window (82 successful, 85 failed attacks). Intercepts not reported. Entries in bold indicate
that the coefﬁcients differ between successful and failed attacks at the 90% conﬁdence level.ﬁgures 3.1 and 3.2, in that we consider the variables one at a time (in simple
bivariate regressions). The ﬁrst two columns conﬁrm that there are few sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences in the impact of these variables between the default state
(tranquility) and the crisis state in the year preceding the event. The con-
clusion holds for both successful attacks and successful defenses. Similarly,
there are few signiﬁcant diﬀerences in their impact between successful at-
tacks and successful defenses in the immediately preceding period. In par-
ticular, diﬀerences are evident only in the eﬀect of ﬁnancial depth, for which
we do not have an explanation, and in the eﬀect of changes in international
reserves, which is inevitable, given the way we deﬁne successful attacks and
successful defenses. Recall that successful attacks are cases in which reserve
losses have a large eﬀect—in the present context, a large coeﬃcient—on the
probability of an exchange rate change, whereas successful defenses are
cases in which reserve losses—in the present context, evidence of an at-
tack—do not have an analogous eﬀect. Thus, it must be the case that we ob-
tain diﬀerent coeﬃcients on the net change in reserves prior to successful
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Table 3.2 Multivariate Multinomial Logit Results: Year Before Crises
Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful
Attacks Defenses Attacks Defenses Attacks Defenses
GDP growth –0.04 –0.00 –0.07 –0.05 –0.15 –0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Inﬂation –0.004 –0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Budget deﬁcit –0.08 –0.08
(0.04) (0.04)




Interest spread –0.003 –0.001
(0.005) (0.004)
Short-term/ 0.05 0.03
total debt (0.02) (0.03)
Debt service –0.03 –0.05
(0.04) (0.06)
Real effective  0.01 –0.00
exchange rate (0.01) (0.01)
M2/reserves –0.07 –0.03
(0.03) (0.02)
N 460 269 335
Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.04 0.06
Equality test 
(P-value) 0.67 0.97 0.29
Notes: Multinomial logit estimation: z-statistics in parentheses. Default cell is tranquility. Intercepts not
reported. Three-year exclusion window (82 successful, 85 failed attacks).attacks and successful defenses. (Note that we are discussing here the eﬀect
of reserve losses on the outcome, not the size of those reserve losses. In fact,
reserves are actually smaller and fall faster prior to successful defenses,
which cuts against the argument that successful attacks are those that are
somehow more intense.)
On the other hand, a number of signiﬁcant diﬀerences are evident in the
year following the crisis, most notably in the behavior of gross domestic
product (GDP) growth, as we emphasize throughout the paper, but also in
money growth, import growth, the real interest rate, and the ratio of saving
accounts (M2) to GNP.
In sum, we ﬁnd that failure to successfully defend the currency against at-
tack has real costs in terms of GNP. That post-crisis decline in growth is not
obviously attributable to precrisis characteristics of the economy (com-
pared to countries that successfully defend the currency against attack).
The proximate source of that decline in growth in turn is the fall decline in
consumption and rise in the risk premium, suggesting a deterioration in
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Table 3.3 Multivariate Multinomial Logit Results: Year After Crises
Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful Successful
Attacks Defenses Attacks Defenses Attacks Defenses
GDP growth –0.15 –0.03 –0.14 0.06 –0.16 –0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Inﬂation –0.001 –0.020
(0.001) (0.010)
Budget deﬁcit –0.10 –0.11
(0.03) (0.04)




Interest spread –0.002 –0.002
(0.004) (0.007)
Short-term/ 0.060 0.001
total debt (0.02) (0.03)
Debt service 0.06 –0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
Real effective  –0.01 –0.00
exchange rate (0.01) (0.01)
M2/reserves –0.10 –0.03
(0.05) (0.02)
N 486 282 353
Pseudo-R2 0.11 0.08 0.07
Equality test 
exchange rate 0.01 0.01 0.07
Notes:Multinomial Logit Estimation: z-statistics in parentheses. Default cell is tranquility. Intercepts not
reported. Three-year exclusion window (82 successful, 85 failed attacks).conﬁdence. Although the real exchange rate, export growth, and the current
account buﬀer these negative eﬀects, they do so incompletely. The acceler-
ation of M1 growth and inﬂation suggests that it is loss of the monetary an-
chor and of monetary discipline that lies behind the deterioration in conﬁ-
dence and precipitates the output losses.
3.3 Multivariate Analysis
The preceding comparisons are univariate. We now turn to multivariate
analysis, drawing models from the literature on the determinants of cur-
rency crises.
Again, we ﬁrst ask whether there is any evidence that economic and ﬁ-
nancial variables have diﬀerent impacts on the likelihood of a successful at-
tack and a successful defense, now considering a variety of such variables
simultaneously. We then ask whether the pre- and post-crisis behavior of
output and other variables diﬀers signiﬁcantly depending on the success or
failure of the attack, now controlling for other characteristics of the econ-
omy. The null is that the evolution and eﬀects of the variables of interest are
statistically distinguishable from one another before (after) successful at-
tacks and successful defenses.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the results of estimating a series of multi-
nomial logit models by maximum likelihood. Table 3.2 contains estimates
for three diﬀerent specifications, using data for the year preceding the cri-
sis. Table 3.3 reports the same three specifications, but using data for the
year following the crisis. We report the coeﬃcients and their associated z-
statistics (the latter in absolute value terms).16Tranquility (i.e., observations
that are not within three years of an attack) is the default cell; the coeﬃ-
cients therefore capture the diﬀerential impact of a variable on the proba-
bility of a successful attack or a successful defense, compared to the tran-
quil default state.
The bottom of the table provides various diagnostics and hypothesis
tests. The most important of these is the p-value for the test statistic that the
coeﬃcients are identical for the successful attacks and the successful de-
fenses. A high number is consistent with the hypothesis, whereas a low one
rejects it.
The default speciﬁcation is at the left of the table: it includes growth, in-
ﬂation, measures of monetary and ﬁscal policy, the interest rate, and the
current account.17 The ﬁt (as measured by the R2) is predictably unimpres-
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16. All slopes are multiplied by 100. Constants are included in the regressions but not
recorded.
17. This speciﬁcation is not the result of extensive pretesting; rather, we simply adopt the
speciﬁcation used to analyze the correlates of crises in Eichengreen and Rose (2000b). How-
ever, to establish robustness, we also display the results of estimating two additional speciﬁca-
tions.sive, consistent with the generally poor performance of leading-indicator
models.18 However, what matters is that there continue to be few signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between successful attacks and successful defenses before the
event, but a variety of signiﬁcant diﬀerences thereafter. An alternative spec-
iﬁcation (in the middle two columns) uses a trio of ﬁnancial variables as
controls: the interest rate spread, the share of short-term debt in the exter-
nal debt burden, and the ratio of debt service to GDP. Still another speciﬁ-
cation (in the last two columns) substitutes two measures of external vul-
nerability: reserve adequacy (the M2-reserve ratio) and the real eﬀective
exchange rate. The results for output are the same regardless of the choice
of controls.
Table 3.4 quantiﬁes the cost of a successful speculative attack. It reports
the results of regressing the growth rate of real GDP on one-year lags of
dummy variables for successful attacks and successful defenses, along with
a variety of controls. If speculative attacks, whether successful or unsuc-
cessful, have no eﬀect on growth rates after a year, then the coeﬃcients on
both dummy variables should be zero. However, given what we have seen so
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18. This is something we have emphasized elsewhere; see Eichengreen and Rose (2001a).
Table 3.4 Costs of a Successful Attack (Dependent variable is growth of GDP)
Without High One-Year
Inﬂation Obs Window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lagged successful  –3.19 –1.22 –3.76 –3.20 –3.06 –2.80
attack (0.82) (0.59) (1.19) (0.83) (0.88) (0.72)
Lagged successful  –0.61 –0.09 –0.98 0.64 –0.81 0.11
defense (0.64) (0.56) (0.92) (0.66) (0.69) (0.57)
Lagged growth 0.36 1.91 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.36
(0.05) (0.24) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Lagged inﬂation 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lagged budget  –0.02 –0.01 –0.01 –0.03 –0.02
deﬁcit (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Lagged money  –0.01 0.01 0.01 –0.01 –0.01
growth (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lagged current  –0.05
account def. (0.07)




R2 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.17 0.16
N 1,003 2,501 580 983 903 1,003
Note: Constant terms estimated but not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.far, we expect the coeﬃcient on the lag of a successful attack to be negative,
large, and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. We expect the coeﬃcient on suc-
cessful defenses to be less important and to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the co-
eﬃcient on successful attacks.
Table 3.4 shows six variants of this output equation, estimated on a vari-
ety of controls and samples. Regardless of sample and speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd
that both hypotheses are supported. The coeﬃcients indicate a signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on output in the case of successful attacks but not in the case
of successful defenses. In each case, the coeﬃcients on successful attacks
and successful defenses diﬀer from one another at conventional conﬁdence
level. The results suggest that the cost of a successful attack (relative to a
successful defense) is 2–3 percentage points of GDP.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we report additional sensitivity analysis in order to estab-
lish the robustness of our ﬁndings. We ﬁrst consider a variety of perturba-
tions of the basic methodology, and we then implement a variety of further
corrections for observable and unobservable heterogeneity.
3.4.1 Perturbations of the Methodology
In perturbing the basic methodology, we started with our default speciﬁ-
cation, which includes inﬂation, the budget and current account balances
(relative to GDP, multiplied by 100), and the ratio of M2 to GDP. We then
made the following changes. We
• substituted a one-year exclusion window for the three-year window;
• added the IMF dummy for the presence or absence of capital controls;
• added the trio of ﬁnancial controls (the interest rate spread, the share
of short-term debt in the external debt burden, and the ratio of debt ser-
vice to GDP) to the benchmark speciﬁcation (rather than substituting
them, as in table 3.4);
• added controls for external vulnerability (reserve adequacy and the
real eﬀective exchange rate) to the benchmark speciﬁcation (rather
than substituting them, as in table 3.4);
• dropped the high-inﬂation countries (deﬁned as countries with inﬂa-
tion in excess of 100 percent per annum);
• added a measure of (lagged) banking crises, to test whether countries
with ﬁnancial-sector problems were both less able to mount a success-
ful defense and more likely to suﬀer large output losses subsequently;
• added lags of currency crises to test whether countries that suﬀered
from chronic exchange-rate problems were both less able to defend (re-
ﬂecting, inter alia, less credibility) and more likely to suﬀer severe re-
cessions when attacked;
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(OECD) countries;
• added interaction terms between successful attacks and successful de-
fenses on the one hand and per capita income on the other as a way of
testing whether the output eﬀects of successful defenses are smaller in
high-income countries.
Many of these perturbations yield interesting and plausible results. For
example, countries that suﬀered currency crises in previous periods are
more likely to suﬀer currency crises in the current period. However, criti-
cally, none of these changes signiﬁcantly weakens either of our key results.
Table 3.5 reports the relevant p-values (where a low number indicates that
we can reject the null that output growth is the same for successful and un-
successful attacks). It will be evident that none of these perturbations mod-
iﬁes the ﬁnding that successful attacks and successful defenses are essen-
tially indistinguishable prior to the event. Similarly, the evidence of a more
severe post-crisis recession in countries that fail to rebuﬀthe attack remains
robust. Interestingly, there is only weak evidence that the output eﬀects of
successful attacks are smaller in high-income countries (the interaction
term between successful attacks and per capita income has the expected
sign—indicating smaller eﬀects in high-income countries—but it is in-
signiﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels).
3.4.2 Other Sources of Heterogeneity
A potential objection to our results is that countries that fail to defend
themselves against speculative attacks diﬀer in ways that are not easily cap-
tured by standard macroeconomic and ﬁnancial aggregates. These unob-
servable characteristics could both make it more diﬃcult for their govern-
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Table 3.5 P-Values for Test of Equality of Slopes for Successful Attacks and
Successful Defenses
Year Before Crises Year After Crises
One-year windowing 0.73 0.00
With IMF capital controls measure added 0.53 0.00
Benchmark + ﬁnancial 0.89 0.01
Benchmark + external 0.84 0.05
Without high inﬂation observations 0.32 0.01
With banking crises 0.49 0.07
With lagged currency crises 0.64 0.00
Without OECD observations 0.73 0.02
With per capita income interactions added 0.45 0.02
With country credit rating added 0.45 0.00
Notes: A low P-value number indicates rejection of the hypothesis that the slopes for success-
ful and failed attacks are identical. Default multinomial logit speciﬁcation, with ﬁve macro re-
gressors.ments to defend the currency against attack and lead to disappointingly
weak economic performance in the subsequent period. For example, the
Asian crisis trained the spotlight on the importance of bank regulation for
economic and ﬁnancial stability. In this case, the argument would be that a
hidden problem of nonperforming loans that does not show up in the sta-
tistics both makes it more diﬃcult for a government to fend oﬀ a specula-
tive attack (it is reluctant to raise interest rates and hold them at higher lev-
els for fear of further aggravating the problems of an already weak banking
system) and makes for a deeper recession following the collapse of the cur-
rency (because the banking system is in fact weaker than in countries that
succeed in mounting a successful defense). It is not the success or failure of
the defense per se that produces the diﬀerent macroeconomic outcome sub-
sequently, in other words, but an omitted third variable (some other char-
acteristic of the country that is diﬃcult to observe by the econometrician)
that is responsible for both the success of the attack and the depth of the
post-crisis recession.
These diﬃcult-to-observe characteristics of countries are what the rating
agencies are in business to detect. We therefore added to our speciﬁcation
the country credit ratings published in Institutional Investor magazine.19We
use annual averages of semiannual ratings, which range from 0 at the bot-
tom to 100 at the top.
Adding credit ratings changes little (again, see table 3.5). Although the
raw credit ratings are somewhat higher for countries that succeed in de-
fending their currencies against attack (not surprisingly), the diﬀerence is
not signiﬁcant once we control for observable macroeconomic and ﬁnan-
cial characteristics. Rating-agency intelligence does not suggest, in other
words,  that countries that succeed and fail to defend their currencies
against attack diﬀer signiﬁcantly before the event in otherwise unobserv-
able ways. Our ﬁrst result—that countries that succeed and fail to defend
themselves against a speculative attack are basically indistinguishable ex
ante—survives this extension. So does our second result: countries that are
unable to defend themselves against the speculative attack continue to do
significantly worse in the post-attack period even after we control for the
diﬃcult-to-quantify characteristics captured by their pre-attack credit rat-
ings.20
It could be that in focusing on macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables we
have neglected important political determinants of both the ability of gov-
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19. A regression of these credit ratings on country characteristics (on annual data for the
1990s) yields an R-squared of 0.46 (Eichengreen and Mody 2000). Thus, readily quantiﬁed
economic and ﬁnancial conditions explain less than half of the variation in this measure, sug-
gesting that it may add value.
20. Following their crises, countries unable to mount successful defenses of course do worse
both in terms of output and credit ratings. This reﬂects the tendency for ratings to follow ac-
tual performance.ernments to defend their currencies against attack and the severity of the
postattack recession. Where the government lacks public support and is un-
able to credibly commit to policy reform, statements of readiness to, inter
alia, raise interest rates to defend the currency will not be taken at face value.
High interest rates may be seen as a sign of desperation rather than as a
commitment to defend. If such a government is then forced to abandon its
exchange rate commitment, doubts about its commitment to the pursuit of
sound and stable alternative policies may lead to an unusually severe post-
crisis recession. This is the story told of Indonesia following its 1997 crisis,
for example. Again, the implication is that a third variable—in this case, po-
litical weakness—explains both the failure of the defense and the poor per-
formance of the economy following the crisis; there is no direct connection
between the success or failure of the defense and what comes after.
We therefore considered a series of political variables: whether the elec-
toral system was proportional or majoritarian, whether the crisis occurred
in a year immediately before or after an election, whether government was
divided or the same party controlled all houses of the congress or parlia-
ment, whether the government was left or right wing, and whether the po-
litical system was presidential or parliamentary.21One ﬁnds in the literature
on the political economy of exchange rate policy (e.g., Garrett 1998;
Leblang 1999; Leblang and Bernhard 2000) arguments for the reasons each
of these variables should aﬀect the ability to make credible commitments
to defend the rate.
Their introduction changed nothing. There are no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in these political variables either before or after the event.22
Adding them reveals no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences before success-
ful attacks and successful defenses in the behavior of the major macroeco-
nomic and ﬁnancial variables. Moreover, their addition does nothing to
weaken our ﬁnding of large diﬀerences in the post-crisis evolution of out-
put as a function of whether defense of the currency was successful.
Some readers will worry that our benchmark speciﬁcation, even aug-
mented by country credit ratings and political variables, still does not cap-
ture ways in which countries that were unable to defend their currencies and
subsequently suﬀered post-crisis recessions diﬀer from other countries.23We
therefore applied an econometric treatment for unobserved heterogeneity.
We estimated a ﬁrst-stage probit designed to explain why some countries
succeeded in defending their currencies while others did not, constructed
the Inverse Mills Ratio from the residuals of this equation, and added that
ratio as an additional explanatory variable to our benchmark regression ex-
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21. We thank David Leblang for kindly providing these data.
22. This is true whether we consider them individually in bivariate comparisons, or as a
group in multivariate analysis.
23. The criticism to which the rating agencies have been subjected for failing to predict re-
cent crises provides some grounds for this suspicion.plaining postattack economic performance. We modeled the success or fail-
ure of the defense as a function of inﬂation, the government deﬁcit-GDP ra-
tio, and the M2-GDP ratio. We used two variants to explain GDP growth.
As in table 3.4, our default speciﬁcation controls for the eﬀects of lagged
growth, inﬂation, the government deﬁcit-GDP ratio, and the growth rate of
M1. The alternative speciﬁcation controls for lagged output growth alone.
Our key ﬁnding survives this extension unscathed. As shown in table 3.6,
adding the Inverse Mills Ratio to the regression for post-crisis economic
performance does not alter the central ﬁnding that countries that success-
fully defend themselves against attacks grow faster in the post-crisis period.
3.5 Implications
Summarizing, we ﬁnd that countries that are unable to defend their cur-
rencies against attack experience signiﬁcant post-crisis output losses com-
pared to countries that mount a successful defense. Those output losses are
signiﬁcant; we consistently obtain estimates on the order of 3 percent of
GNP. However plausible the assumption, we detect no evidence that coun-
tries that fail to sustain a successful defense and suﬀer post-crisis out-
put losses enter their crises with greater economic, financial, and political
weaknesses than do countries that succeed in repelling the speculative at-
tack and avoiding post-crisis output losses. We do find plausible and sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between pre-crisis conditions in countries that do and
those that do not experience speculative attacks, but, to repeat, this is not
the subject of our paper.
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Table 3.6 Determinants of GDP Growth with “Heckit” Correction
Output growth lagged 0.36 0.36
(0.05) (0.05)
Successful attack lagged –3.2 –3.2
(0.79) (0.80)




Budget lagged (% GDP) –0.01
(0.05)
M1 growth lagged 0.001
(0.007)
Observations 889 885
P-value: coefﬁcients = 0 0.00 0.00
  (s.e.) 0.27 0.30
(0.12) (0.13)
Notes: OLS coefﬁcients (corrected for selection) with robust standard errors. Selection equa-
tion includes inﬂation, M2/GDP, budget deﬁcit (% GDP), and current account (% GDP).The output losses that follow failed defenses generally reﬂect a collapse
of consumption, along with some fall in investment. That this takes place
despite a decline in real interest rates clearly signals a negative shock to con-
ﬁdence, as does the post-crisis rise in risk premiums in countries that invol-
untarily abandon their ﬁxed rates. The rise in money growth and inﬂation
in countries that fail to mount a successful defense is a strong hint of where
the shock to conﬁdence is originating: namely, it reﬂects the decline in mon-
etary discipline that follows the loss of the nominal anchor provided by the
previously prevailing exchange rate regime.
These results reinforce the ﬁndings of previous studies of exits from
pegged exchange rates like Eichengreen et al. (1998). These authors analyze
twenty-nine exits by developing countries from single-currency pegs or bas-
ket pegs to managed exchange rates or independent ﬂoats. They ﬁnd that
growth is signiﬁcantly lower in the year of the exit than in two control
groups of countries: those that continued to peg without exiting, and all
other developing countries in the World Bank database. Our results are
more reﬁned in that the sample of exits is larger, we limit the control group
to other countries that also experienced speculative attacks but did not exit,
and we control for a variety of economic, ﬁnancial, and political character-
istics of the countries experiencing crises. However, the central conclusion
of that previous study continues to hold: exiting involuntarily in response
to a crisis is painful and tends to result in signiﬁcant output losses. It is bet-
ter for countries seeking to move to greater exchange rate ﬂexibility to do
so voluntarily when the currency is strong rather than as the result of an at-
tack.
This previous study speculated that loss of the nominal anchor—that is,
of the exchange rate peg that provided the focal point for the country’s mon-
etary policy operating strategy—resulted in a loss of policy discipline and
of conﬁdence that compounded the crisis. Our paper provides evidence in
support of this conjecture.
A ﬁnal fact that emerges from our study is that defenses, like attacks, are
heterogeneous.24 This is evident in the relatively large 2–standard deviation
bands that surround the macroeconomic and ﬁnancial variables in ﬁgures
3.1 and 3.2. The negative output eﬀects of failed defenses may average 3 or
4 percentage points of growth, but they vary widely. Some recent cases—
Brazil in 1998 springs to mind—are notable for having held these costs to
lower levels. The popular explanation for their success is that they were
quick to put in place an alternative monetary policy operating strategy:
Brazil, for example, replaced its currency peg with an explicit inﬂation-
targeting framework. There was no loss of monetary discipline, and the ac-
celeration of inﬂation was minimal. The risk premium fell rather than ris-
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24. The heterogeneity of currency crises—that is to say, speculative attacks—was a theme
of Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995).ing, and consumption did not collapse. There can be no clearer example of
what the authorities should do to minimize the costs of a failed defense.
We see the broader policy implications as follows. There are two types of
monetary-cum-exchange rate arrangements that are compatible with a
world of high capital mobility. One is a very hard exchange rate peg that the
authorities commit to defending unconditionally if attacked. The other is a
clear and credible monetary policy operating strategy not oriented around
the level of the exchange rate, such as a full-ﬂedged inﬂation-targeting
framework. A very hard peg, supported by a credible commitment to de-
fend it, can prevent costly speculative attacks that collapse the currency,
whereas the installation of a clear and credible alternative monetary policy
strategy such as inﬂation targeting, in the event that the decision is taken to
abandon the exchange rate anchor, can help to minimize the disturbance to
conﬁdence. Soft pegs, with no provision for an alternative monetary an-
chor, are the worst of all worlds.
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Comment Richard Portes
This paper provides convincing evidence of the output costs of failing to de-
fend a currency peg. This is powerful and important, and the empirical
work is careful and thorough. But, the interpretation and some of the spe-
ciﬁc results raise a number of questions.
There are several puzzling results. First, the authors ﬁnd that no variables
characterizing the precrisis state of an economy aﬀect the probability that a
speculative attack against its currency will succeed. As they acknowledge,
this appears to go against several papers that claim to have identiﬁed lead-
ing indicators of crises. I myself do not ﬁnd this particularly surprising. I
have been consistently skeptical about the early-warning systems, because
they use little theory (or many theories, without discrimination) on lots of
numbers and often come close to data mining. Still, it might be helpful if the
authors could give us their considered view of why their regressions refuse
to reveal any information about when and why attacks succeed rather than
fail. That might be diﬃcult, however, since here too there is no underlying
model. That weakens their interpretation of the main result, as I shall sug-
gest.
There are other puzzles. No variables characterizing the precrisis state of
an economy explain diﬀerences in postcrisis performance as between cases
of successful attacks and successful defenses. In particular, the magnitude
of output loss consequent upon a successful attack seems independent of
the precrisis state. This is certainly counterintuitive and indeed goes against
the authors’ priors, as they tell us.
The role of the real exchange rate in these results is at best confusing, at
worst quite surprising. There seems to be no identiﬁable diﬀerence in the be-
havior of the real exchange rate in the postcrisis period between economies
that succumb to a successful attack, going oﬀ their currency peg, and those
that defend the peg successfully. If the reader too ﬁnds this anomalous, see
note 15, the “Year After” section of table 3.1, and table 3.3. I cannot believe
there is any problem with the data the authors use, but if a successful attack
should have any consequences at all relative to successful defense within a
year, the expected outcome is real exchange rate depreciation. Again, we are
due some attempt at explanation here.
82 Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. Rose
Richard Portes is professor of economics at London Business School and a research associ-
ate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.The last of my puzzles relates to the central result itself. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) tells a country to tighten both monetary and ﬁscal
policy in order to prop up its currency, and we have regularly witnessed sac-
riﬁces to this end—most recently and tragically in Argentina. It is therefore
no less than astonishing that a successful defense against speculative attack
appears to have no output cost. I doubt that even the strongest proponents
of the “franc fort” in the early 1990s would argue that the successful defense
of the French franc in the exchange rate mechanism in autumn 1992 was
costless. (It is not an out to say that the attacks were ultimately successful in
July 1993.) There are many similar examples.
Regarding the output loss due to a failed defense, my prior would have
been that the eﬀect would be less strong in more advanced economies with
more robust economic institutions. The authors claim to have dealt with
this issue (raised at the conference) with the interaction term involving per
capita income, in order to assess whether the output eﬀects of successful at-
tacks are smaller in high-income countries. They do indeed ﬁnd evidence
that this is so, but the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant. Still, that is not dealing
directly with the conjecture, which suggests simply running the regressions
separately for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and non-OECD countries. I would be very surprised if the output
eﬀect were not signiﬁcantly smaller in the former.
Why should a country try hard to defend against a speculative attack? I
doubt that it is simply that they know the Eichengreen-Rose result and are
desperately trying to avoid the short-run output cost of a failed defense.
Many countries have seen maintaining a currency peg as a long-run issue.
The peg may be their last shot at a consistent monetary policy strategy; it
may deeply implicate the credibility of policy makers; it may be a key ele-
ment in a trade or political system that the country takes very seriously; it
may be simply that the policy makers are afraid of ﬂoating and its implica-
tions.
This relates to the authors’ interpretation of their key result. They argue
that a successful attack shocks the conﬁdence of markets in the prospects
for economic stability. “We thus observe a loss of policy discipline.” This is
a non sequitur, however: that markets become skeptical might in fact induce
sensible policy makers to maintain discipline in order to change market per-
ceptions. In any case, if they do lose discipline, we might see an acceleration
of money growth, as the authors suggest. This is reminiscent of the second-
generation crisis models, which the authors know well but leave out of the
story. But, they also suggest that we should see a rise in risk premia: this is
unrelated to policy discipline, but it would indeed follow from their original
story about market confidence. They should decide which interpretation
they prefer, or explicitly maintain both (although, as I suggested, they may
be contradictory).
Wherever they do end up, their empirical work provides no evidence to
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tack on risk premiums, nor on inﬂation. Moreover, although a standard test
shows that the coeﬃcients on money growth do diﬀer between cases of suc-
cessful attack and successful defense, if you look at the estimated coeﬃ-
cients and z-statistics, it is hard to take this very seriously. The story or sto-
ries simply do not come out of the data.
Discussion Summary
Allan Drazen noted that the paper does not make a clear distinction be-
tween a successful (and unsuccessful) defense and a successful (and unsuc-
cessful) attack. Either a failed defense or a decision not to attempt a defense
might result in a successful attack.
Martin Eichenbaum remarked that it seems from the data that it is a ran-
dom decision whether to defend, which, to him, seemed improbable.
Andrew K. Rose responded that he is looking into attempted defenses
only: following Kraay, these are ones in which reserves decreased by a cer-
tain percent. Andrew Bergnoted that in this case a country’s decision to pay
back a large loan to the IMF is identiﬁed as a successful defense even
though there was no attack.
Peter B. Kenen noted that there does not seem to be any diﬀerence in in-
terest rate spreads between the two subsets, so it seems there are interest rate
defenders in both subsets.
Joshua Aizenman questioned whether it is possible to test directly for the
output cost as a result of the loss of the nominal anchor, suggesting that it
may be possible by controlling for the duration of the peg and history of
previous crises.
Kenneth Kletzermade a reference to previous research that was unable to
ﬁnd leading indicators of crises. Having said that, he noted that in table 3.1
there is a diﬀerence in net international reserves prior to the crisis. He sug-
gested that might help explain the paper’s ﬁndings.
Michael M. Hutchisonremarked that devaluing the currency would likely
have dynamic long-run eﬀects that are not captured in this model. He sug-
gested extending the sample period in order to capture these reversal eﬀects.
Edwin M. Truman,following others, noted that the Kraay variable of cur-
rency crises is problematic, as there are a lot of reasons that reserves can go
down. He also noted that it seems likely that either governments that are in
a very strong position or ones that are weak choose to attempt a defense.
This asymmetry, he suggested, should be accounted for in the model. Third,
he asked what the policy implications of the paper’s ﬁndings are. That de-
pends, he stated, on the exact nature of the crisis in question.
84 Barry Eichengreen and Andrew K. RoseMartin Feldstein inquired whether the output costs of a defense that the
authors ﬁnd are permanent and, if so, how that can be, since the exogenous
eﬀect is of a demand shock.
Vincent Reinhart commented that the output loss could be due to a loss
of conﬁdence or to a rejection of the present regime. It might even be caused
by the change in regime following the crisis, so it will be beneﬁcial to exam-
ine those ex post changes and control for them.
Michael P. Dooley questioned whether the big crises, such as the Mexico
1994 or Asia 1997 crises, are not fundamentally diﬀerent from the many
other small crises in the authors’ data set.
Rose responded ﬁrst to Portes’s concern that the paper does not diﬀer-
entiate between OECD and non-OECD countries by noting that it was one
of the sensitivity checks in table 3.5. In response to Hutchison, he noted
that they did run some long-run regressions covering three years but found
signiﬁcant results were for the ﬁrst year only. He added that they used other
crisis deﬁnitions besides Kraay’s, but that did not make much diﬀerence.
He also stated that it seems the status of the banking industry is accounted
for by the inclusion of market perceptions in the regressions. He also
doubted whether the data would allow diﬀerentiation between permanent
and temporary eﬀects. Barry Eichengreen responded that he and Andrew
Rose planned to follow through on a number of these suggestions, but he
was skeptical that doing so would change the central results. He noted that
there had been much general discussion of the policy implications of the
ﬁndings. His take on these implications was that only very hard pegs and
relatively free ﬂoats are workable in a world of high capital mobility. A hard
peg will be workable if the commitment to defend it is fully credible,
whereas ﬂoating will be feasible provided that the authorities articulate a
clear and coherent monetary policy operating strategy such as inﬂation tar-
geting. Intermediate exchange rate regimes, on the other hand, are a recipe
for disaster.
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